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Abstract. Function secret sharing (FSS) scheme is a mechanism that
calculates a function f(x) for x ∈ {0, 1}n which is shared among p parties,
by using distributed functions fi : {0, 1}n → G (1 ≤ i ≤ p), where G
is an Abelian group, while the function f : {0, 1}n → G is kept secret
to the parties. Ohsawa et al. in 2017 observed that any function f can
be described as a linear combination of the basis functions by regarding
the function space as a vector space of dimension 2n and gave new FSS
schemes based on the Fourier basis. All existing FSS schemes are of
(p, p)-threshold type. That is, to compute f(x), we have to collect fi(x)
for all the distributed functions. In this paper, as in the secret sharing
schemes, we consider FSS schemes with any general access structure.
To do this, we observe that Fourier-based FSS schemes by Ohsawa et
al. are compatible with linear secret sharing scheme. By incorporating
the techniques of linear secret sharing with any general access structure
into the Fourier-based FSS schemes, we show Fourier-based FSS schemes
with any general access structure.
Keywords: function secret sharing, distributed computation, Fourier basis, lin-
ear secret sharing, access structure, monotone span program
1 Introduction
Secret sharing (SS) schemes are fundamental cryptographic primitives, which
were independently invented by Blakley [4] and Shamir [21]. SS schemes involve
several ordinary parties (say, p parties) and the special party called a dealer.
We suppose that the dealer has a secret information s and partitions the secret
information s into share information Si (0 ≤ i ≤ p) which will be distributed
to the i-th party. In (n, p)-threshold SS scheme, the secret information S can
be recovered from n shares (collected if any n parties get together), but no
information on s is obtained from at most n− 1 shares. This threshold property
can be discussed in terms of access structures. An access structure (A,B) consists
of two classes of sets of parties such that (1) if all parties in some set A ∈ A get
together then the secret information can be recovered from their shares; (2) even
if all parties in any set B ∈ B get together then any information of the secret
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s cannot be obtained. For example, the access structure (A,B) of the (n, p)-
threshold SS scheme can be defined as A = {A ⊆ {1, . . . , p} : |A| ≥ n} and
B = {B ⊆ {1, . . . , p} : |B| < n}. Besides the access structure of the threshoold
type, many variants have been investigated in the literature [3,6,7,13,15,17]. As a
standard technique for constructing access structures, monotone span programs
[14,10,11,18] are often used.
The idea where a secret information is secretly disributed to several parties
can be applied to a function. The idea of secretly distributing a function has
an application in private information retrieval (PIR) [8,9,16] as demonstrated
in [12]. Gilboa et al. [12] consider to distribute point functions (DPFs) fa,b :
{0, 1}n → G, where fa,b(x) = b if x = a for some a ∈ {0, 1}n and fa,b(x) = 0
otherwise. In a basic DPF scheme, the function f is partitioned into two keys
f0, f1 and each key is distributed to the respective party of the two parties. Each
party calculates the share yi = fi(x) for common input x by using the key fi. On
the other hand, each fi does not give any important information (e.g., the value
a for fa,b) on the original function. The functional value of the point function fa,b
can be obtained by just summing up two shares y0 and y1 of the two parties.
Boyle et al. [5] investigate the efficiency in the key size and extend the two-
party setting into the multi-party setting. Moreover, they generalize the target
functions (i.e., point functions) to other functions, and propose an FSS scheme
for some function family F in which functions f : {0, 1}n → G can be calculated
efficiently. In the multi-key FSS scheme we partition a function f ∈ F into p
distributed functions (f1, . . . , fp). Likewise, an equation f(x) =
∑p
i=1 fi(x) is
satisfied with respect to any x, and the information about the secret function
f (except the domain and the range) does not leak out from at most p − 1
distributed functions. Moreover, distributed functions fi can be described as
short keys ki and it is required to be efficiently evaluated.
In [20], Ohsawa et al. observed that any function f from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}
can be described as a linear combination of the basis functions by regarding
the function space as a vector space of dimension 2n. While the point functions
fa,1 (for all a ∈ {0, 1}n) constitute a (standard) basis for the vector space, any
function f : {0, 1}n → {±1} can be represented as a linear combination of the
Fourier basis functions χa(x) = (−1)〈a,x〉, where 〈a, x〉 denotes the inner product
between vectors a = (a1, . . . , an) and x = (x1, . . . , xn). Based on the above
observation, Ohsawa et al. gave new FSS schemes based on the Fourier basis. If
we limit our concern to polynomial-time computable FSS schemes, functions for
which the existing schemes are available would be limited. Since polynomial-time
computable functions represented by combinations of point functions are quite
different from ones represented by the Fourier basis functions, point function
based FSS schemes and Fourier function based FSS schemes are complementary.
We note that properties of some functions are often discussed in the tech-
nique of the Fourier analysis. Akavia, Goldwasser and Safra [1] introduced a
novel framework for proving hard-core properties in terms of Fourier analysis.
Any predicates can be represented as a linear combination of Fourier basis func-
tions. Akavia et al. show that if the number of non-zero coefficients in the Fourier
representation of hard-core predicates is polynomially bounded then the coeffi-
cients are efficiently approximable. This fact leads to the hard-core properties.
Besides hard-core predicates, it is well known that low-degree polynomials are
Fourier-concentrated [19].
Contribution
Since the existing FSS schemes are of (p, p)-threshold type, it is natural to con-
sider the possibility of FSS schemes with any threshold structure of (n, p)-type
and even general access structures as in the case of SS schemes.
In this paper, we affirmatively answer to this question. As mentioned, Fourier-
based FSS schemes in [20] are quite simpler than the previous FSS schemes. This
is because Fourier basis functions have some linear structure. Shamir’s threshold
SS scheme can be seen as an application of the Reed-Solomon code, which is
a linear code. Both the distribution phase and the reconstruction phase can
be described in a linear algebraic way. From this viewpoint, we construct an
(n, p)-threshold Fourier-based FSS scheme. Moreover, SS schemes with general
access structure can be discussed in terms of monotone span program (MSP).
The underlying structure of SS schemes by using MSP is similar to the linear
algebraic view of Shamir’s (n, p)-threshold SS scheme, we can similarly construct
Fourier-based FSS schemes with general access structure.
Technically speaking, Ohsawa et al.[20] consider a function from {0, 1}n to C.
That is, they consider Fourier transform over n-dimensional vector space of F2.
On the other hand, we consider a function from a finite field Fq (of prime order
q) to C. So, in this paper, we consider the Fourier transform over Fq rather than
(F2)n. The shift of the underlying mathematical structure enables to construct
FSS schemes with general access structure.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Access Structure and Monotone Span Program
Let us assume that there are p parties in an SS (or, FSS) scheme. A qualified
group is a set of parties who are allowed to reconstruct the secret and a forbidden
group is a set of parties who should not be able to get any information about
the secret. The set of qualified groups is denoted by A and the set of forbidden
groups by B. The set A is said to be monotonically increasing if, for any set
A ∈ A, any set A′ such that A′ ⊇ A is also included in A. The set B is said to be
monotonically decreasing if, for any set B ∈ B, any set B′ such that B′ ⊆ B is
also included in B. If a pair (A,B) satisfies that A∩B = ∅, A is monotonically
increasing and B is monotonically decreasing, then the pair is called a (monotone)
access structure. If an access structure (A,B) satisfies that A∪B coincides with
the power set of {1, . . . , p}, we say that the access structure is complete. If we
consider a complete access structure, we may simply denote the access structure
by A instead of (A,B), since B is equal to the complement set of A.
As mentioned, there are several ways to realize general access structures.
Monotone span program (MSP) is a typical way to construct general access
structures. Before mentioning the MSP, we prepare some basics and notations
for linear algebra.
An m× d matrix M over a field F defines a linear map from Fd to Fm. The
kernel of M , denoted by ker(M), is the set of vectors u ∈ Fd such that Mu = 0.
The image of M , denoted by im(M), is the set of vectors v ∈ Fm such that
v = Mu for some u ∈ Fd.
A monotone span program (MSP)M is a triple (F,M, ρ), where F is a finite
field, M is an m × d matrix over F, ρ : {1, . . . ,m} → {1, . . . , p} is a surjective
function which labels each row of M by a party. For any set A ⊆ {1, . . . , p},
let MA denote the sub-matrix obtained by restricting M to the rows labeled
by parties in A. We say that M accepts A if e1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0)T ∈ im(MTA ),
otherwise we say M rejects A. Moreover, we say that M accepts a (complete)
access structure A if the following is equivalent: M accepts A if and only if
A ∈ A.
When M accepts a set A, there exists a recombination vector λ such that
MTAλ = e1. Also note that e1 6∈ im(MTB ) if and only if there exists a vector ξ
such that MBξ = 0 and the first element of ξ is 1.
2.2 Function Secret Sharing
The original definition in [5] of FSS schemes are tailored for threshold schemes.
We adapt the definition for general access structures. In an FSS scheme, we
partition a function f into keys ki (the succinct descriptions of fi) which the
corresponding parties Pi receive. Each party Pi calculates the share yi = fi(x)
for the common input x. The functional value f(x) is recovered from shares yA
in a qualified set A of parties, which is a sub-vector of y = (y1, y2, . . . , yp), by
using a decode function Dec. Any joint keys ki in a forbidden set B of parties
do not leak any information on function f except the domain and the range of
f . We first define the decoding process from shares.
Definition 1 (Output Decoder) An output decoder Dec, on input a set T of
parties and shares from the parties in T , outputs a value in the range R of the
target function f .
Next, we define FSS schemes. We assume that A is a complete access structure
among p parties and T ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , p} be a set of parties.
Definition 2 For any p ∈ N, T ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , p}, an A-secure FSS scheme with
respect to a function class F is a pair of PPT algorithms (Gen,Eval) satisfying
the following.
– The key generation algorithm Gen(1λ, f), on input the security parameter
1λ and a function f : D → R in F , outputs p keys (k1, . . . , kp).
– The evaluation algorithm Eval(i, ki, x), on input a party index i, a key ki,
and an element x ∈ D, outputs a value yi, corresponding to the i-th party’s
share of f(x).
Moreover, these algorithms must satisfy the following properties:
– Correctness: For all A ∈ A, f ∈ F and x ∈ D,
Pr[Dec(A, {Eval(i, ki, x)}i∈A) = f(x) | (k1, . . . , kp)← Gen(1λ, f)] = 1.
– Security : Consider the following indistinguishability challenge experiment
for a forbidden set B of parties, where B 6∈ A:
1. The adversary D outputs (f0, f1)← D(1λ), where f0, f1 ∈ F .
2. The challenger chooses b← {0, 1} and (k1, . . . , kp)← Gen(1λ, fb).
3. D outputs a guess b′ ← D({ki}i∈B), given the keys for the parties in the
forbidden set B.
The advantage of the adversary D is defined as Adv(1λ,D) := Pr[b = b′] −
1/2. The scheme (Gen,Eval) satisfies that there exists a negligible function
ν such that for all non-uniform PPT adversaries D which corrupts parties
in any forbidden set B, it holds that Adv(1λ,D) ≤ ν(λ).
2.3 Basis functions
The function space of functions f : Fq → C can be regarded as a vector space of
dimension q. Therefore, the basis vectors for the function space exist and we let
hi(x) be each basis function. Any function f in the function space is described
as a linear combination of the basis functions
f(x) =
∑
j∈Fq
βjhj(x),
where βj ’s are coefficients in C.
The Fourier basis
Let f : Fq → C, where q is an odd prime number. The Fourier transform of the
function f is defined as
fˆ(a) =
1
q
∑
x∈Fq
f(x)e−2pi(ax/q)i, (1)
where i is the imaginary number. Then, f(x) can be described as a linear com-
bination of the basis functions χa(x) = e
2pi(ax/q)i, that is,
f(x) =
∑
a∈Fq
fˆ(a)χa(x).
In the above, fˆ(a) is called Fourier coefficient of χa(x). By using ωq = e
(2pi/q)i,
the primitive root of unity of order q, we can denote each Fourier basis function
by
χa(x) = (ωq)
ax
and let BF = {χa | a ∈ Fq} be the sets of all the Fourier basis functions.
It is easy to see that the Fourier basis is orthonormal since
1
q
∑
x∈Fq
χa(x)χb(x) =
{
1 if a = b,
0 otherwise.
(2)
In this paper, we consider only Boolean-valued functions and assume that the
range of the boolean function is {±1} instead of {0, 1} without loss of generality.
That is, we regard boolean functions as mappings from Fq to {±1}. Also, we
have
χa+b(x) = χa(x)χb(x).
This multiplicative property plays an important role in this paper.
3 Linear Secret Sharing
3.1 Shamir’s Threshold Secret Sharing
First, we give a traditional description of Shamir’s (n, p)-threshold SS scheme
[21], where p ≥ n ≥ 2. Let s be a secret integer which a dealer D has. First,
the dealer D chooses a prime number q > s and a polynomial g(X) ∈ Fq[X] of
degree n− 1. Then, the dealer D computes si = (i, g(i)) as a share for the i-th
party Pi and sends si to each Pi. For the reconstruction, n parties get together
and recover the secret s by the Lagrange interpolation from their shares.
The above procedure can be equivalently described as follows. Let M be
an n × p Vandermonde matrix and mi be the i-th row in M . That is, mi =
(1, i, i2, . . . , in−1). Let b = (b0, b1, . . . , bn−1)T be an n-dimensional vector such
that b0 = s and b1, . . . , bn−1 are randomly chosen elements in Fq. Let y =
(s1, s2, . . . , sp)
T = Mb. The share si for Pi is the i-th element of y, that is, si =
〈mTi , b〉, where 〈·, ·〉 denotes the inner product. Let A be a subset of {1, 2, . . . , p}
which corresponds to a set of parties. Let MA be a submatrix of M obtained
by collecting rows mj for all j ∈ A. We similarly define a subvector yA by
collecting elemetnts sj for all j ∈ A. Let e1 = (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0)T ∈ (Fq)n. Then we
can uniquely determine λ such that MTAλ = e1 by solving an equation system
if and only if |A| ≥ n. Then, we have
s = 〈b, e1〉 = 〈b,MTAλ〉 = 〈MAb,λ〉 = 〈yA,λ〉.
Since yA corresponds to all shares for Pj (j ∈ A), we can reconstruct the secret
s by computing the inner product 〈yA,λ〉.
3.2 Monotone Span Program and Secret Sharing
Here, we give a construction of linear secret sharing (LSS) based on Monotone
Span Program (MSP). Here, we do not mention how to construct MSP. For the
construction of MSP, see the literature, e.g., [14,6,10,11]. In this paper, we will
use the LSS schemes. Since the LSS schemes imply MSPs [2,22], it is sufficient
to consider MSP-based SS schemes.
Let s ∈ Fq be a secret which the dealer D has andM = (Fq,M, ρ) be an MSP
which corresponds to a complete access structure A. The dealer D considers to
partition s into several shares. In the sharing phase, the dealer D chooses a
random vector r ∈ (Fq)p−1 and sends a share 〈mTi , (s, r)T 〉 to the i-th party.
In the reconstruction phase, using the recombination vector λ, any qualified set
A ∈ A of parties can reconstruct the secret as follows:
〈λ,MA(s, r)T 〉 = 〈MTAλ, (s, r)T 〉 = 〈e1, (s, r)T 〉 = s.
Regarding the privacy, let B be a forbidden set of parties, and consider the joint
information held by the parties in B. That is, MBb = yB , where b = (s, r)
T .
Let s′ ∈ Fq be an arbitrary value and let ξ be a vector such that MBξ = 0 and
the first element in ξ is equal to 1. Then yB = MB(b+ξ(s
′−s)), where the first
coordinate of the vector b+ ξ(s′ − s) is now equal to s′. This means that, from
the viewpoint of the parties in B, their shares yB are equally likely consistent
with any secret s′ ∈ Fq.
4 Our Proposal
As mentioned, any function can be described as a linear combination of ba-
sis functions. If the function is described as a linear combination of a super-
polynomial number of basis functions, then the computational cost for eval-
uating the function might be inefficient. We say that a function has a suc-
cinct description (with respect to the basis B) if the function f is described as
f(x) =
∑
h∈B′ βhh(x) for some B′ ⊂ B such that |B′| is polynomially bounded
in the security parameter. If we can find a good basis set B, some functions may
have a succinct description with respect to B. We consider to take the Fourier
basis as such a good basis candidate.
We will provide an FSS scheme for some function class whose elements are
functions with succinct description with respect to the Fourier basis BF . Since
the Fourier basis has nice properties, our FSS scheme with general access struc-
ture can be realized.
In what follow, we assume that the underlying basis is always the Fourier ba-
sis BF . Moreover, we assume thatM = (Fq,M, ρ) is an MSP which corresponds
to a general complete access structure A. We will consider Fourier-based FSS
schemes with this access structure.
4.1 FSS scheme for the Fourier basis
In this subsection, we consider to partition each Fourier basis function χa(x) =
(ωq)
ax into several keys. That is, we give an FSS scheme with general access
structure with respect to the function class BF .
Our FSS scheme with respect to BF consists of three algorithms GenF1 (Algo-
rithm 1), EvalF1 (Algorithm 2), and Dec
F
1 (Algorithm 3). Gen
F
1 is an algorithm
that divides the secret a (for χa(x)) into p keys (k1, . . . , kp) as in the SS scheme
with the same access structure. Each key ki is distributed to the i-th party Pi.
Note that the secret a can be recovered from the keys ki for all i in a qualified
set A ∈ A.
In EvalF1 , each party obtains the share by feeding x to the function dis-
tributed as the key. DecF1 is invoked in order to obtain the Fourier basis function
χa(x) from the shares.
The correctness follows from
χa(x) = (ωq)
ax
= (ωq)
〈yA,λ〉x
= (ωq)
(
∑
kiλi)x
=
∏(
(ωq)
kix
)λi
.
For the security, we assume that an adversary D chooses (f0, f1) where f0 =
χa and f1 = χb. Then the challenger chooses a random bit c to select fc and
invokes GenF1 (1
λ, a) if c = 0 and GenF1 (1
λ, b) if c = 1. If c = 0 then a is divided
into p keys. If c = 1 then b is divided into different p keys. From the argument
in Section 3.2, the guess for the secret information a (resp., b) is a perfectly
random guess. That is, the inputs to the adversary D are the same in the two
cases. Thus, the adversary D cannot decide if the target function is either χa(x)
or χb(x). It implies that only D can do for guessing the random bit c selected by
the challenger is just a random guess. So, Adv(1λ,D) = 0. This concludes the
security proof.
4.2 General FSS Scheme for Succinct Functions
Since we do not know how to evaluate any function efficiently, we limit ourselves
to succinct functions with respect to the Fourier basis BF . Note that succinct
functions with respect to BF do not coincide with succinct functions with respect
to point functions. Simple periodic functions are typical examples of succinct
functions with respect to BF , which might not be succinct functions with respect
to point functions. As mentioned, some hard-core predicates of one-way functions
are succinct functions with respect to BF .
Let FBF ,` be a class of functions f which can be represented as a linear
combination of ` basis functions (with respect to BF ) at most, where ` is a
polynomial in the security parameter. That is, f has the following form:
f(x) =
∑`
i=1
βiχai(x).
We construct an FSS scheme with general access structure (GenF≤`,Eval
F
≤`,Dec
F
≤`)
for a function f ∈ FBF ,` as follows. Note that the construction is a simple adap-
tation of the Fourier-based FSS scheme over (F2)n in [20].
Algorithm 1 GenF1 (1
λ, a)
Choose a random vector r ∈ (Fq)p−1 uniformly ;
for i = 1 to p do
mi ← the i-th row of M ;
ki ← 〈mi, (a, r)T 〉
end for
Return (k1, . . . , kp).
Algorithm 2 EvalF1 (i, ki, x)
vi ← (ωq)kix ;
Return (i, vi).
Algorithm 3 DecF1 (A, {(i, vi)}i∈A)
Compute a recombination vector λ = (λ1, . . . , λp)
T from A ;
Return w =
∏
i∈A(vi)
λi .
– GenF≤`(1
λ, f) : On input the security parameter 1λ and a function f , the key
generation algorithm (Algorithm 4) outputs p keys (k1, . . . , kp).
– EvalF≤`(i, ki, x) : On input a party index i, a key ki, and an input string x ∈
Fq, the evaluation algorithm (Algorithm 5) outputs a value yi, corresponding
to the i-th party’s share of f(x).
– DecF≤`(A, {yi}i∈A) : On input shares {yi}i∈A of parties in a (possibly) qual-
ified set A, the decryption algorithm (Algorithm 6) outputs a solution f(x)
for x.
In the above FSS scheme (GenF≤`,Eval
F
≤`,Dec
F
≤`) for succinct functions f ∈
FB,`, we invoke FSS scheme (GenF1 ,EvalF1 ,DecF1 ) for basis functions BF , since
f can be represented as a linear combination of at most ` basis functions. In
this construction, we distribute each basis function χai(x) and each coefficient
βi as follows. We invoke (Gen
F
1 ,Eval
F
1 ,Dec
F
1 ) to distribute each basis function
χai(x) and use any SS scheme with the same access structure to distribute each
coefficient βi.
The correctness of (GenF≤`,Eval
F
≤`,Dec
F
≤`) just comes from the correctness
of each FSS scheme (GenF1 ,Eval
F
1 ,Dec
F
1 ) for the basis function χai(x) and the
correctness of each SS scheme for the coefficients. But some care must be done.
From the assumption, f ∈ FBF ,` has ` terms at most. If we represent f as a
linear combination of exactly ` terms, some coefficients for basis functions must
be zero. Since the 0-function χ0(x) = (ωq)
0·x = 1 which maps any element x ∈ Fq
Algorithm 4 GenF≤`(1
λ, f(·) = ∑`i=1 βiχai(·))
for i = 1 to ` do
(ki1, k
i
2, . . . , k
i
p)←GenF1 (1λ, ai) ;
(si1, s
i
2, . . . , s
i
p)←iThe sharing phase of some SS scheme, given βi ;
end for
for j = 1 to p do
Set kj ← (k1j , k2j , . . . , k`j) ;
Set sj ← (s1j , s2j , . . . , s`j) ;
end for
Return ((k1, s1), . . . , (kp, sp)).
Algorithm 5 EvalF≤`(i, (ki, si), x)
for j = 1 to ` do
yij ←EvalF1 (i, kij , x) ;
end for
Set yi = (y
i
1, y
i
2, . . . , y
i
`) ;
Return (i,yi, si).
Algorithm 6 DecF≤`(A, {(i,yi, si)}i∈A)
for i = 1 to ` do
gi ←DecF1 (A, {(j, yji )}j∈A) ;
βi ←The reconstruction phase of the SS scheme, on input {sji}j∈A ;
end for
Return g =
∑`
i=1 βigi.
to 1 can be partitioned into several functions as the ordinary basis functions can
be, we can apply (GenF≤`,Eval
F
≤`,Dec
F
≤`) as well.
The security of (GenF≤`,Eval
F
≤`,Dec
F
≤`) can be discussed as follows. Without
of loss of generality, we assume that all parties in a forbidden set B (where
|B| = m) get ((k1, s1), . . . , (km, sm)). For any i with 1 ≤ i ≤ `, the m-tuples
of the i-th elements of k1, . . . ,km are identical whatever the basis function for
the i-th term of the target function is, because the advantage of any adversary
against (GenF1 ,Eval
F
1 ,Dec
F
1 ) is 0 as discussed in Section 4.1. Moreover, for any
i with 1 ≤ i ≤ `, the m-tuples of the i-th elements of s1, . . . , sm are identical
whatever the coefficient for the i-th term of the target function is, because of
the perfect security of the underlying SS scheme with the same access structure.
Furthermore, the outputs of several executions of GenF1 (even for the same target
basis function) are independent because each GenF1 uses a fresh randomness.
Thus, the information that all the parties in B can get is always the same
regardless of the target function f ∈ FBF ,`. This guarantees the security of
(GenF≤ `,EvalF≤`,DecF≤`).
Remark. If we do not care about the leakage of the number of terms with non-zero
coefficients for f , we can omit the partitioning of zero-functions, which increases
the efficiency of the scheme.
5 Conclusion
By observing that Fourier-based FSS schemes by Ohsawa et al.[20] are compat-
ible with linear SS schemes, we have provided Fourier-based FSS schemes with
general access structure, which affirmatively answers the question raised in [20].
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